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Abstract
We consider the interplay between income distribution and optimal
commodity taxation, linking equity issues to optimal taxes through the
eﬀect of income distribution on market demand and its price elastic-
ity. We ﬁnd conditions to conciliate the equity and eﬃciency tradeoﬀ
and to assess the impact of inequality changes on the optimal taxa-
tion of necessity and luxury goods. We show that the regressivity or
progressivity of the tax system is determined by the distribution of
luxuries and necessities in the economy. If the tax system is regressive
(progressive), a decrease (increase) of income inequality leads to an
average decrease of the optimal tax rates, achieving welfare gains for
society. Our analysis provides a framework to investigate the linkages
between direct and indirect taxation.
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1 Introduction
Commodity taxation is one of the main sources of government revenue. Ac-
cording to  (2014) and European Commission (2014), taxation of goods
and services in 2012 accounted for 34% of the tax revenue in Europe (11%
of ), and 17.9% of the US tax yield (4.4% of ). The most important
form of commodity taxation in Europe, i.e. 	, collected 922 billion euros in
2012, amounting to 7.1% of EU-26 , despite the 177 billion tax ﬂow lost
in informal or black markets (Barone et al., 2014). Given the huge amount of
ﬁnancial resources absorbed by such taxes, the design and implementation of
an optimal commodity taxation system is an important choice for the public
sector, as well as for the wellbeing of a society.
Optimal commodity taxation has been strictly related to second-best
policies since the seminal paper by Ramsey (1927), who simply ruled out
the possibility of using lump sum taxes in a single agent economy. Since
then, the main theoretical body on the issue has been developed in the 70s
and 80s — the focus being on the features and properties of "second-best",
fair and eﬃcient consumption taxes, under diﬀerent conditions in terms of
the number and types of goods, individual heterogeneity, partial or general
equilibrium, presence of market failures, compliance costs.1 Arguably, the
equity-eﬃciency tradeoﬀ represents the most inﬂuential result for its public
policy implications: once agent heterogeneity is brought into the analysis,
there arises a conﬂict between eﬃciency and equity reasons for second-best
optimal consumption taxation.2 Indeed, eﬃciency requires higher taxation
on goods with lower price elasticity, which however are typically necessities
1As to types and number of commodities, Corlett and Hague (1953) consider two goods
and leisure, introducing labour supply decision in the optimal commodity literature. This
framework was further developed by Meade (1955), Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-57), Har-
berg (1971), Atkinson and Sadmo (1980), King (1980). As to individual heterogeneity see
Diamond and Mirless (1971), Feldstein (1972), Diamond (1975); in particular, Diamond
and Mirless (1971) was the seminal paper including production into the analysis. The
presence of market failures was addressed, inter alios, by Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971),
Atkinson and Stern (1974), Sadmo (1975), Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Cremer, Gah-
vari and Ladoux (1998), Bovenberg and Goulder (2002), Fullerton (1996). On compliance
costs see, e.g., Cremer and Gahvari (1993). Boadway (2012) provides a recent general
survey.
2The second best scenario is particularly suitable with agent heterogeneity, since lump
sum person-speciﬁc taxes are unfeasible, and diﬃcult to administer in a multi consumer
setting.
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representing a big share of expenditure for low-income individuals; this would
negatively aﬀect the wealth and welfare of people at the bottom of the income
distribution, and increase inequality. As a consequence, an inequality-averse
government would tax more heavily goods with higher price elasticity, which
implies an eﬃciency loss.
It is in general well known that modeling aggregate demand as depend-
ing on aggregate (or mean) income may lead to misleading results, since it
overlooks the eﬀect of individual heterogeneity on aggregate behaviour. In
studying commodity taxation, the analysis of the eﬀect of the income distrib-
ution on market demand and its price elasticity becomes quite relevant, as the
sensitivity of demand to price changes is the main factor driving the conﬂict
between equity and eﬃciency. This paper focuses on the interplay between
income distribution and optimal commodity taxation, in order to evaluate
how income distribution aﬀects second-best optimal commodity taxes. We
ﬁnd suﬃcient statistics, which in principle may be useful for policy reforms,
to test whether inequality changes should lead to lower (higher) taxation
of necessities and luxuries. Actually, incorporating equity issues via income
distribution within optimal tax formulas, allows us to ﬁnd situations where
the tradeoﬀ between equity and eﬃciency can be reconciled.
We model changes in income distribution as second-order stochastic-
dominance shifts, such that a change of an exogenous parameter of the in-
come density function standardly identiﬁes an increase in inequality for a
given mean. Although in our context income is exogenous, it can be looked
at as the outcome of "deep primitives" driving individual choices in terms of
labour supply, savings, wealth accumulation (e.g.: Chetty, 2009a). That is,
we apply the concept of (net) taxable income, formalised in an elegant way
by Feldstein (1999), as quite a useful notion in this framework, since it allows
to avoid the "structural approach" of modelling labour supply decisions. In
other words, we use a "reduced form" concept of income which implicitly
incorporates complex decisions in terms of time, eﬀort, skills, and so on.3
Moreover, we do not specify the source of the inequality shock which hits
3More precisely, the exogenous individual income (y) is related to individual taxable
income (I) as y = (1−T )I + e, where e is the individual tax shelters, and T is the income
tax, which is not a control variable in our setting. See Feldstein (1999), Chetty (2009a,b),
or Saez (2012) for a critical survey on taxable income. Since y is exogenous (and so also the
income tax), our setting is equivalent to a scenario in which one of the goods is leisure that
will not be the object of optimal commodity taxation, and can be choosen as a numéraire
(e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976, p. 59-63).
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the income distribution: this can also be caused by government interventions
on ﬁscal policies, such as income taxation, rebates, tax credits and other
forms of taxation. In this sense, our framework can suggest a way to look at
the interplay of direct and indirect taxation diﬀerent from the existing liter-
ature, where the linkages between optimal commodity and income taxations
are usually addressed using the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) approach. The
latter has generated a great deal of research on second best interventions us-
ing linear-nonlinear income taxes and uniform vs diﬀerentiated commodity
taxation;4 however, their "structural approach" to modelling labour supply
is characterized by an intrinsic complexity, which makes it quite diﬃcult to
obtain clear cut results without assuming strong restrictions on the func-
tional form of utility. Our framework overcomes such a complexity, in that
we investigate directly the impact of shocks to the income distribution on op-
timal commodity taxes, independently of the source of such shocks: by doing
so, even if the shock is not driven by an optimal income taxation policy, one
can in principle assess how (non optimal) changes in the income taxation
aﬀect the optimal taxation of necessities and luxuries, without looking at
the complementarity or substitutability of such goods with leisure, which are
diﬃcult to test empirically.
In our model, we start by identifying the set of eﬃcient taxes, which allows
to interpret the Lagrangian multiplier as a measure of progressivity or regres-
sivity of the tax system. In order to evaluate the regressive (or progressive)
eﬀects of the commodity tax burden, we extend the notion of regressivity
embodied in the literature on optimal commodity taxation, which is usually
limited to the observation of individual consumption shares decreasing with
income. To this aim, we apply the notion of liability progression, tradition-
4The well known Atkinsons-Stiglitz (AS) theorem states suﬃcient conditions on the
utility function for diﬀerentiated commodity taxation to be replaced by non-linear income
taxation for second-best policy (or alternatively by a mix of uniform sales tax and non-
linear income tax). Stronger conditions are required for diﬀerentiated commody taxation
to be replaced by linear income taxation (i.e., linear Engel curve uniform across individual
besides weak separability and uniform sub-utility across individuals: see Deaton, 1979).
Boadway and Pestieau (2003), and Boadway (2012, pp.57-85) provide excellent discussion
of the stream of literature generated by the AS framework to include, e.g, heterogeneous
preferences (Saez, 2002), diﬀerent individual needs (Cremer et al., 2001), non optimal
income taxes (Konishi,1995; Laroque, 2005, Kaplow, 2006), externalities (Cremer et al.,
1998), luxury and necessity (Boadway and Pestieau, 2012), various uses of time (Boadway
et al., 1994; Boadway and Gahvari, 2006), and other issues. Piketty and Saez (2013)
discuss a more direct proof of AS theorem due to Laroque (2005) and Kaplow (2006).
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ally used to assess the progressivity of income taxation. We show that this
index depends on the distribution of necessities and luxuries in the economy,
and is incorporated in the Lagrangian multiplier.
Following a change in income distribution, two eﬀects emerge: a direct
eﬀect, which is driven by the impact of income distribution on aggregate
demand; and an indirect eﬀect, due to the individual behavioral response to
tax (price) changes: the former is a sort of "mechanical eﬀect" and the latter
of "behavioural eﬀect" (Saez, 2002). In order to discriminate between these
two eﬀects for a given commodity, we ﬁnd a simple statistics which depends
on the properties of both the Engel curve of that commodity, and (the mean
and variance of) the income distribution. When the direct eﬀect dominates,
tax adjustments are determined by the eﬀect of the distributional change on
market demand, which allows to recover the classical equity-eﬃciency trade-
oﬀ in the no-cross-eﬀect scenario: higher equality may make the demand for
a necessity more rigid, which leads to eﬃciency calling for its heavier tax-
ation. By contrast, however, higher inequality can lead to the demand for
a luxury (necessity) being more rigid (elastic), implying its higher (lower)
taxation — that is, there arise situations where the conﬂict between eﬃcient
and fair taxation can be overcome. Finally, we look at some aggregate impli-
cations: we show that if the system is suﬃciently progressive (regressive), an
increase (decrease) of income inequality should lead to an average decrease of
consumption taxation. This certainly occurs if luxuries dominate necessities
in the individual tax liability — in which case, the taxation adjustment will
lead to a welfare gain for society and again no trade-oﬀ presents itself.
The paper is organised as follows. After a presentation of the general
framework in Section 2, we analyse how the progressivity of the tax system
can be linked to the Lagrangian multiplier. We then assess in Section 3
the eﬀects on consumption taxation of changes in income distribution, and
take up the related implications both on the single commodity and in the
aggregate. In Section 4 we revisit the traditional trade-oﬀ between equity
and eﬃciency, which we consider in terms of welfare in Section 5. Concluding
remarks are gathered in Section 6.
2 Basic deﬁnitions and general framework
We consider consumers’ heterogeneity as solely due to income diﬀerences. In-
come y ∈ Y is continuously distributed over some positive support [ymin, ymax]
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= Y, with F : Y × Θ → [0, 1] the associated distribution; Θ ⊂ R is some
parameter space: θ ∈ Θ is a distribution parameter which — as will be clear
below — we use to measure inequality; we denote the income density by
f(y, θ) = ∂F
∂y
, so that µ =

Y
yf(y, θ)dy > 0 is aggregate (mean) income. We
use σ2 =

Y
(y − µ)2 f(y, θ)dy to denote income variance.
There are i = 1, ..., n commodities, such that the Marshallian demand for
commodity i by a consumer whose income is y, is qi (p, y), p = (p1, ..., pn)
being the price vector. Market demand for that commodity is accordingly
Qi(p, θ) =

Y
qi(p, y)f(y, θ)dy
We assume throughout that for all i = 1, ..., n, qi is a normal good, i.e.
∂qi
∂y
≥ 0 for all y ∈ Y.
We now proceed to formulate the standard problem of optimal com-
modity taxation in terms of the indirect utility v(p, y) = u(q(p, y)), where
q = (q1, ..., qn) is a consumption vector. By deﬁning the maximization prob-
lem in terms of aggregate utility (a utilitarian social welfare function), we
have
max
t
V (p, θ) = max
t

Y
v(p, y)f(y, θ)dy (1a)
while the revenue constraint will be
i
tiQi(p, θ) = R (1b)
where p = p + t, with p the given vector of net prices pi, i = 1, ..., n. The
Lagrangian becomes
L =

Y
v(p, y)f(y, θ)dy − λ

R−

i
tiQi(p, θ)

so that:
∂L
∂ti
=

Y
∂v
∂pi
f(y, θ)dy + λ

Qi +

j
tj
∂Qj
∂pi

= 0, i = 1, ..., n
∂L
∂λ
= R−

i
tiQi(p, θ) = 0
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From Roy’s identity, ∂v
∂pi
= −qi(p, y)
∂v
∂y
, hence the ﬁrst n equations can be
written as
j
tj
∂Qj
∂pi
+Qi =
1
λ

Y
∂v
∂y
qi(p, y)f(y, θ)dy, i = 1, ..., n (2)
where

Y
∂v
∂y
qi(p, y)f(y, θ)dy > 0 is the average marginal utility of income,
weighted by the quantity of commodity i.
The solution of problem (1a,b) gives a tax system t = (t1, ..., tn), i.e. a
set of eﬃcient tax rates. As a ﬁnal step before proceeding to our analysis, a
characterisation of the progressivity of such a system is useful.
2.1 The λ multiplier and "structural" progressivity
As is well known, the multiplier λ represents the shadow cost in terms of
social welfare of increasing tax revenue by an additional unit. However,
when income distribution is speciﬁcally considered, λ can be seen to reﬂect
the degree of income progressivity (or regressivity) of the tax system. This is
not surprising in itself, as the shadow cost of a unit increase of tax revenue is
bound to depend on how sensitive the tax revenue is to variations in income.
Consider the optimality condition (2) for commodity i,
j
tj
∂Qj
∂pi
+Qi =
1
λ

Y
∂v
∂y
qi(p, y)f(y, θ)dy
and sum both sides over i after multiplication by pi. One gets
i
pi

j
tj
∂Qj
∂pi
+ µ = 1
λ

Y
∂v
∂y
yf(y, θ)dy
Now observe that

i pi

j tj
∂Qj
∂pi
=

j tj

i pi
∂Qj
∂pi
, and that by the homo-
geneity of the individual demand curve
i
pi
∂qj
∂pi
+ y
∂qj
∂y
= 0
Then it must be true that
−

Y

j
tjy
∂qj
∂y
f(y, θ)dy + µ = 1
λ

Y
∂v
∂y
yf(y, θ)dy
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so that
λ =
1
µ−R′

Y
∂v
∂y
yf(y, θ)dy (3)
whereR′ =

Y

j tj
∂qj
∂y
yf(y, θ)dy and µ =

i piQi by the (aggregate) budget
constraint. Since the numerator is surely positive, the sign of λ is given by
the denominator: the latter is
µ−R′ =

Y
y

1−

j
tj
∂qj
∂y

f(y, θ)dy
From the individual budget constraint, we get

j pj
∂qj
∂y
=

j(pj + tj)∂qj∂y =
1, which implies 1 −

j tj
∂qj
∂y
=

j pj ∂qj∂y : thus if the goods are normal,
µ−R′ > 0 and λ > 0.
We are now ready to connect λ to the overall progressivity (or regressivity)
of the tax system. By (3),
λ = µ−R
µ−R′

Y
∂v
∂y
yf(y,θ)
µ−R
dy = α

Y
∂v
∂y
yf(y,θ)
µ−R
dy
where

Y
∂v
∂y
yf(y,θ)
µ−R
depends on the tax structure only via marginal utility
∂v
∂y
, while α = (µ−R) / (µ−R′) can be looked at as an aggregate index of
"progressivity". To see this, consider the liability progression index ℓ(t, y)
deﬁned as
ℓ(t, y) =
y

i ti
∂qi(p,y)
∂y
i tiqi(p, y)
(4)
i.e., ℓ is the income elasticity of the individual tax burden τ (t, y) =

i tiqi(p, y).
If ℓ(t, y) > 1 indirect taxation is "structurally" progressive, in the sense that
it is characterized by a more-than-proportional rise in the commodity tax li-
ability, relative to the increase in income (by the same token, ℓ < 1 identiﬁes
a regressive tax structure). The corresponding aggregate expression would
be
L(t, θ) =

Y
y

i ti
∂qi(p,y)
∂y
f(y, θ)dy
Y

i tiqi(p, y)f(y, θ)dy
=
R′
R
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so that a natural deﬁnition of the progressivity or regressivity of the tax
system t = (t1, ..., tn) should be the following:
Deﬁnition The tax system t is progressive if L(t, θ) > 1; it is regressive if
L(t, θ) < 1.
As is well known, using ℓ as a measure of tax liability progression has been
generally related to income taxation (e.g., Jakobsson, 1976; Tanzi, 1976; Fries
et al., 1982; Hutton and Lambert, 1982; Lambert, 1993). Here we use this
notion to describe how the individual and aggregate burden of consump-
tion taxation react to income changes. It is thus a "structural" progression
measure of the commodity tax system, since it gives information on how con-
sumption tax revenue reacts to changes in income.5 Clearly, given a set of
tax rates t, the way consumption tax revenue will react to changes in income
depends on the convexity or concavity of Engel curves and the way they are
aggregated in the individual tax burden τ . Indeed, the system turns out to
5One way to see in what sense ℓ is a measure of progressivity when applied to indi-
rect taxation, is by referring to concentration curves. Following Kakwani (1977), let a
concentration curve for commodity i be deﬁned as
Ci(a, θ) =
1
Qi (p, θ)
 y(a,θ)
ym
qi (p, y) f(y, θ)dy
where y (a, θ) is the percentile function such that F (y (a, θ) , θ) = a. Dividing through and
multiplying by ti > 0, the same concentration curve can be read as a concentration curve
for the tax liability tiqi (p, y) associated to commodity i, deﬁned as
Cτi (a, θ) =
1
tiQi (p, θ)
 y(a,θ)
ym
tiqi (p, y) f(y, θ)dy = Ci(a, θ)
from which one can derive
i
ωiC
τ
i (a, θ) =
1
R
 y(a,θ)
ym
τ (t, y) f(y, θ)dy = Lτ (a, θ; t)
where Lτ (a, θ; t) is the concentration curve of the overall tax burden, and ωi =
tiQi(p, θ)/R is the share of commodity i’s taxation on overall revenue. Take now two
tax vectors t and t′, such that ℓ = ℓ′: one way of saying that ℓ is a measure of progressiv-
ity is by noting that if ℓ > ℓ′ for all y’s, the tax burden is shared less equally under ℓ (i.e.,
the rich pay more) i.e. Lτ (a, θ; t) < Lτ (a, θ; t′): which is surely the case under Kakwani’s
Theorem 1 (1977, p.720), since the diﬀerence in the relevant elasticities is indeed ℓ−ℓ′ > 0
(see also Benassi and Chirco, 2006, example 1).
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be progressive (regressive) if the individual tax burden is a convex (concave)
function of income, i.e. luxuries weigh more (less) than necessities:6
Proposition 1 If luxuries weigh more (less) than necessities in the individ-
ual tax liability τ , the tax system is progressive (regressive).
Proof. The budget constraint obviously implies that

i pi
∂qi
∂y
= 1, which
in turn implies

i pi
∂2qi
∂y2
= 0, meaning that (barring the case where all
Engel curves are linear) some have to be convex and some to be concave:
given some t = (t1, ..., tn), this will determine the sign of
∂2τ
∂y2
=

i ti
∂2qi
∂y2
.
If ∂
2τ
∂y2
> 0, ℓ(t, y) > 1, that is, y

i ti
∂qi(p,y)
∂y
>

i tiqi(p, y), for all y ∈ Y.
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There follows that

Y
y

i ti
∂qi(p,y)
∂y
f(y, θ)dy >

Y

i tiqi(p, y)f(y, θ)dy and
R′ > R, i.e. L(t, θ) > 1. Clearly, R′ < R and L(t, θ) < 1 would follow from
assuming ∂
2τ
∂y2
< 0.
By Proposition 1, the multiplier λ is associated with a measure of pro-
gressivity, as α greater (or lower) than one will signal a tax-burden-to-income
ratio rising (or falling) with income. It should be noticed that the income
convexity (or concavity) of the individual tax liability τ gives a suﬃcient
condition for aggregate progressivity or regressivity of the tax system, given
some vector t: diﬀerent arrays of tax rates may deliver R′ larger or smaller
than R, for the same given income distribution.
The idea of progressivity being somehow hidden inside the Lagrangian
multiplier may be interesting, when connected with the social marginal utility
of income (Diamond, 1975), which in our framework is
γ (t, y) =
∂v
∂y
+ λ
∂τ
∂y
(5)
As is well known, this gives the marginal eﬀect on utility and tax revenue of
a lump sum transfer in favour of an individual with income y. It is generally
assumed that the social marginal utility of income is decreasing in income,
due to an inequality averse government giving more social weight to the poor
6With a slight abus de language, here we identiﬁy luxuries and necessities with reference
to the convexity or concavity of Engel curves.
7We assume that the sign of ∂2qi/∂y
2 does not change with y. Convexity of τ(t, y) wrt
y implies progressivity, i.e. that τ(t, y)/y is increasing in y , if τ(t, 0) = 0 (e.g., Lambert,
2001, p.193).
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(e.g, Feldstein, 1972).8 However, the role of the individual as a tax payer
should also be considered: if the system is suﬃciently progressive then γ may
be increasing in income, and conversely if γ is decreasing in income, there is
a bound on the progressivity of the tax system given by the behaviour of the
marginal utility of income.9
Clearly, Diamond’s result that the multiplier λ can be looked at as the
expected value of γ holds good in our framework, where one can easily see
that10
λ =

Y
γ(t, y)yf(y,θ)
µ
dy (6)
where yf(y, θ)/µ is the density which is relevant for the problem at hand,
i.e. that describing the distribution of income "by income classes" (the ratio
being between the sum total of income accruing to all consumers whose
income is y, and total income).
In order to conclude this descriptive section on the progressivity of the
tax system, some observation on the neutrality of taxation are in order. If
R′ = R, α = 1 and the system will be "neutral": indeed, L = 1 means
that

Y

i ti

y ∂qi(p,y)
∂y
− qi(p, y)
	
f(y, θ)dy = 0, so that in the aggregate we
get the same result one would have with (zero intercept) linear individual
Engel curves. Of course, the latter will indeed be linear if preferences were
homothetic and marginal utility a constant — which would yield λ = ∂v
∂y
µ
µ−R
,
independent of the distribution of income.
8In Diamond’s (discrete framework) formulation, the social marginal utility of income
would be
γ (t, y) =
∂W
∂vh
∂vh
∂yh
+ λ
∂τ
∂yh
In our case, where the social welfare function W is strictly utilitarian, the social planner’s
higher weight for the poor would obviously be the result of the marginal utility of income
being decreasing — an assumption we shall make in the following sections (apparently
supported by the empirical evidence: eg, Layard et al., 2008) .
9This can be see by using deﬁnition (4) for ℓ, and noting that ∂2τ/∂y2 =
λτℓ (ℓ+ ε− 1) /y2, where ε is the income elasticity of ℓ: thus ∂2γ/∂y2 < 0 implies
τℓ (ℓ+ ε− 1) /y2 < −∂2γ/∂y2.
10See Appendix A.
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3 Optimal commodity taxation and income
distribution
In the previous section we have presented a version of the standard optimal
taxation framework, where income distribution can be explicitly considered.
In this section we consider how a change in income distribution, and in
particular a change in the degree of inequality, is likely to aﬀect optimal
commodity taxation. To do so we need a precise measure of inequality, which
we identify by the standard notion of second order stochastic dominance:
i.e., we assume that an increase in θ signals an increase in inequality for
given mean µ, as we take θ to be a (inverse) parameter of second order
stochastic dominance.11 Under this stipulation, in the following sections we
ﬁrst consider the impact of an inequality increase in the single-commodity,
single tax case; then we turn to aggregate implications.
3.1 Implications on the single commodity
Recall the optimality condition (2) for some commodity i

j
tj
∂Qj
∂pi
+Qi =
1
λ

Y
∂v
∂y
qi(p, y)f(y, θ)dy
This can be set in terms of compensated demand by using Slutsky equation:12

j
tj

Y
∂hj
∂pi
f(y, θ)dy = −Qi +
1
λ

Y
γ (t, y) qi(p, y)f(y, θ)dy (8)
where γ (t, y) is the social marginal utility of income deﬁned by (6). Equation
(8), similarly to Diamond (1975, p.338) or Auerbach (1981, p. 107), connects
11An increase in θ signals an increase of inequality in the second order sense if y
ym
(∂F/∂θ) dz ≥ 0 for all y ∈ Y. As is well known, under this deﬁnition lower θ means a
less unequal distribution — an inequality averse social planner would prefer it to a higher
θ distribution; if the further restriction is added that
 yM
ym
(∂F/∂θ) dz = 0 (i.e., mean
income is not altered by changes in θ), θ ranks equal mean distributions by their Lorenz
curve (Atkinson, 1970). See Lambert (2001, ch.3) for an overall assessment of the welfare-
theoretic foundations of inequality measures.
12We substitute for
∂qj
∂pi
=
∂hj
∂pi
−
∂qj
∂y
qi(p, y), where hj = hj (p, v (p, y)).
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the marginal change in the compensated aggregate demand for good i given
on the LHS, Hi say,
13 with an aggregate expression on the RHS in terms of
consumption of commodity i and the social marginal utility of income.
The eﬀect of a change of θ on Hi is given by
∂Hi
∂θ
= −

Y
qi(p, y)fθ(y, θ)dy +
∂
∂θ
1
λ

Y
γ (t, y) qi(p, y)f(y, θ)dy
= −

Y
qi(p, y)fθ(y, θ)dy +
1
λ

Y
(qi − ki) γ (t, y) fθ(y, θ)dy (9)
where ki is independent of y.
14 This expressions allows to distinguish two
eﬀects of an increase in inequality on optimal taxation for commodity i. The
ﬁrst term is the direct eﬀect of the shock on aggregate consumption, which
directly aﬀects the excess burden: it is the change in consumption caused
by the shift in the income distribution. The second eﬀect can be seen as an
indirect eﬀect, driven by the structure of the ﬁscal system: it represents the
changes in individual consumption patterns (and hence in revenue), brought
about by the relative tax (price) adjstments. In a way, the direct eﬀect can
be looked at as a sort of distribution-induced income eﬀect on consumption,
while the latter is a sort of substitution eﬀect, caused by the relative changes
in commodity tax rates and prices.15
Given these deﬁnitions, we now take up the two eﬀects separately. We
ﬁrst have:
Proposition 2 Let an increase in θ signals an increase in inequality for
given mean. If the direct eﬀect dominates the indirect eﬀect, the optimal
tax adjustments require an increase in taxation for luxuries (i.e. a compen-
sated reduction in their aggregate demand), and a decrease in taxation for
necessities.
Proof. If the direct eﬀect dominates, then ∂Hi
∂θ
> 0 if

Y
qi(p, y)fθ(y, θ)dy <
0, and viceversa if

Y
qi(p, y)fθ(y, θ)dy > 0. If good i is a luxury, then (∂
2qi/
13Using the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix, Hi =

j tj

Y
∂hj
∂pi
f(y, θ)dy is the change
in the compensated aggregate demand for good i.
14We derive the second line of equation (9) in Appendix B. From now on we use sub-
scripts to denote derivatives whenever convenient.
15This distinction is somewhat similar to that between the "mechanical" and the "be-
havioral" eﬀects put forward by Saez (2002).
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∂2y) > 0 and

Y
qi(p, y)fθ(y, θ)dy > 0 by the properties of the second order
stochastic dominance.
The proof is quite straightforward, as it plays exclusively on the standard
properties of stochastic dominance; however, it brings forward a noteworthy
implication: if the direct eﬀect dominates, an increase in equality should
lead to a decrease in the taxation of luxuries and an increase in that of
necessities. We shall go back to this issue in Section 4, when we take up the
tradeoﬀ between equity and eﬃciency.
We now consider the indirect eﬀect of an increase in inequality on the
compensated aggregate demand of good i, which from (9) is given by
∂
∂θ


1
λ

Y
γ (t, y) qi(p, y)f(y, θ)dy

= 1
λ

Y
(qi − ki) γ (t, y) fθ(y, θ)dy
In order to assess the sign of this eﬀect, we assume that the social marginal
utility γ is linear in income, i.e. ∂2γ/∂y2 = 0. This assumption, which is
clearly quite convenient in analytical terms, seems to us an acceptable one,
since the second derivative of γ involves third order derivatives, which at a
ﬁrst approximation can arguably be considered negligible.
Let us now deﬁne ηiq and ηγ as the (positive) elasticity of the slope of the
Engel curve for commodity i, and the elasticity of the social marginal utility
of income, respectively:
ηq =
∂2qi∂y2
 y∂qi
∂y
, ηγ =
∂γ
∂y
y
γ
These deﬁnitions allow a neater expressions of the following result:
Proposition 3 Assume ∂
2γ
∂y2
= 0 and let an increase in θ signal an increase
in inequality for given mean; suppose the indirect eﬀect dominates the direct
eﬀect. Then
(a) if the social marginal utility of income is increasing in income, optimal
tax adjustments require a decrease in the taxation of luxuries; taxation on
necessities should decrease if ηq < 2ηγ and it should increase if ηq > 2ηγ;
(b) if the social marginal utility of income is decreasing in income, optimal
tax adjustments require an increase in the taxation of necessities; taxation on
luxuries should increase if ηq < 2
ηγ and it should decrease if ηq > 2 ηγ.
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Proof. If the indirect eﬀect dominates, then the sign of ∂Hi/∂θ is given by
the sign of
1
λ

Y
[qi(p, y)− ki] γ (t, y) fθ(y, θ)dy = A
and, from the properties of second order stochastic dominance, this expres-
sion will be positive or negative, according as ∂
2
∂y2
{[qi(p, y)− k] γ (y, t)} =
γ ∂
2qi
∂y2
+ 2∂γ
∂y
∂qi
∂y
+ (qi − ki)
∂2γ
∂y2
is positive or negative. Consider now case (a)
and assume ∂2γ/∂y2 = 0 < ∂γ/∂y: then, (i) if ∂
2qi
∂y2
> 0, A > 0; (ii) if ∂
2qi
∂y2
< 0
and
ηq < 2ηγ then A > 0; (iii) if ∂2qi∂y2 < 0 and ηq > 2 ηγ then A < 0. As
to case (b), assume ∂2γ/∂y2 = 0 > ∂γ/∂y: then (i) if ∂
2qi
∂y2
< 0, A > 0; (ii)
if ∂
2qi
∂y2
> 0 and ηq > 2
ηγ then A > 0; (iii) if ∂2qi∂y2 > 0 and ηq < 2 ηγ then
A < 0.16
As we have seen, the adjustments of commodity taxation when the di-
rect eﬀect dominates are simply driven by the eﬀect of income distribution
on demand: e.g., following an increase in inequality, taxation on necessities
decreases simply because the aggregate quantity has been reduced by the
distributional shift. However, a markedly diﬀerent — and somewhat more
interesting — pattern occurs if the indirect eﬀect dominates. In such a case,
results diﬀer according to the nature of the goods and the behaviour of the
social marginal utility of income. If the social marginal utility of income is
decreasing, meaning that the overall tax system is regressive (or not very pro-
gressive), the individual marginal tax yield does not increase enough with in-
dividual income: then an increase in inequality will virtually decrease overall
revenue since it will depress the tax liability of some individuals (presumably
the poor), without making good this loss with a suﬃcient increase the tax li-
ability of the rich. In order to satisfy the revenue constraint, the government
should increase taxation more on necessities than on luxuries. Only if the
elasticity of the marginal consumption of luxury is higher that the elasticity
of their social value, does taxation on luxuries decrease. If instead, the social
marginal utility of income is increasing with income, then the taxation sys-
tem is progressive enough to make γ increasing with income. In such a case,
16Since γ is linear in income one can write γ (t, y) = α(t) + β (t) y so that the condition
ηq ≶ 2ηγ can be written as ηq ≶ 2β (t) y/(α(t) + β (t) y), or equivalently
∂2qi
∂y2
/∂qi
∂y
≶
2β (t) /(α(t) + β (t) y).
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the revenue boosted by the consumption of the rich is suﬃcient not only to
compensate for the loss in revenue due to the decrease of consumption of the
poor, but also to reduce taxation. Only if the reduction in consumption of
necessities is higher than the reduction in their social value, should taxation
increase for such goods.
Clearly, at this point we should ask what the sign of the overall eﬀect is
going to be. Ideally, one would like to connect the latter to the curvature of
the demand function. Our main result under this respect is the following:
Proposition 4 Assume ∂
2γ
∂y2
= 0 and let an increase in θ signal an increase in
inequality for given mean. If the social marginal utility of income is decreas-
ing (increasing) in income, optimal tax adjustments on a given commodity
should increase (decrease), i.e. sign

∂Hi
∂θ

= sign

∂γ
∂y

, provided that (a) qi
is convex in income and such that ∂
2qi
∂y2
/∂qi
∂y
< 2µ
µ2+σ2−µymin
, or (b) qi is concave
in income and such that ∂
2qi
∂y2
/∂qi
∂y
> − 2µ
µymax−(µ2+σ2)
.
Proof. See Appendix C
The main implications of Proposition 4 are that if the social marginal
utility of income is decreasing (increasing) in income, the optimal reaction to
an increase in inequality should be that of raising (lowering) taxation on a
given commodity, if the corresponding Engel curve is not too convex or too
concave. The economics behind this is best seen with reference to Proposition
3: it is then readily seen that under conditions (a) and (b) the indirect eﬀect
dominates, which is due to the bound on the slope of the Engel curve. Take
e.g. the case of luxuries with increasing γ: the direct eﬀect — which depends
only on the convexity of the Engel curve — would call for an increase in
taxation (lower Hi) as aggregate quantity increases, while the upper bound
on convexity plus the weight of the increasing social marginal utility of income
allows the indirect eﬀect to dominate and yield a tax decrease. Indeed, the
total eﬀect trades oﬀ the mere quantity eﬀect against the adjustment required
by the behaviour of the social marginal utility of income: if γ is increasing,
the marginal contribution to revenue of higher taxation for a unit increase in
income is itself increasing. Given the income-convexity of qi, higher inequality
drives a higher weight of (the consumption of) high income consumers, which
works directly through the direct eﬀect, and via the weight of the increasing
marginal social utility of income through the indirect eﬀect. The strength of
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the latter vis à vis the former is thus given by how fast the social marginal
utility of income rises relative to its average (λ), compounded with how fast
the quantity qi rises with income: indeed, (9) reads as
Λθ =
∂
∂θ

Y
γ(t,y)
λ
qi(p, y)f(y, θ)dy
With linear γ, its average value (that is, λ) will be increasing in income vari-
ance:17 a lower variance means a higher marginal contribution of γ relative
to λ, and hence looser bounds on the curvature of the Engel curve for the
indirect eﬀect to dominate. In this sense, the indirect eﬀect is more likely to
dominate the direct one, the lower income variance, as this increases the rel-
ative weight of the social marginal utility of income. In Section 4 we discuss
the implications of such results in terms of the equity vs eﬃciency tradeoﬀ.
3.2 Aggregate implications
Let us deﬁne T (t, θ) =

i tiQi(p+t, θ), and let t be the vector of optimal tax
rates solving problem (1), such that, for all i = 1, ..., n, condition (2) holds:

j
tj
∂Qj
∂pi
+Qi =
1
λ

Y
∂v
∂y
qi(p, y)f(y, θ)dy (2)
while the revenure constraint is given by T (t, θ) = R. Implicit diﬀerentiation
of the latter yields:
i
∂T
∂ti
dti
dθ
= −
∂T
∂θ
(10)
Under optimality, a shock to the income distribution should be such that (2)
still holds: thus (10) becomes

i
ki(p, θ)
dti
dθ
= −
∂T/dθ
µ−R′
(11)
where ki(p, θ) =

Y
∂v
∂y
qi(p, y)f(y, θ)dy/

Y
∂v
∂y
yf(y, θ)dy > 0 for all i = 1, ..., n.
This weighted average of tax adjustments is related to the concavity or con-
vexity in income of the individual tax burden.
17Under linearity, γ = α+ βy, so that, using (6), λ = α+ β

µ+ σ2/µ

.
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Proposition 5 Let an increase in θ signal an increase in inequality for given
mean. Then, if luxuries weigh more (less) in the individual tax liability τ
than necessities, i.e. commodity taxation is progressive (regressive), opti-
mality requires an average decrease (increase) in commodity taxation, i.e.
i ki(p, θ)
dti
dθ
< (>)0.
Proof. First notice that µ−R′ > 0, so the sign of

i ki(p, θ)
dti
dθ
depends on
the numerator. The latter can be written as ∂
∂θ

Y
τ(t, y)f(y, θ)dy, and since
an increase in θ amounts to a second order stochastic dominance shift of the
distribution, it follows from the general properties of stochastic dominance
that ∂
∂θ

Y
τ (t, y)f(y, θ)dy > 0 if τ (y, t) is convex in y, i.e. if luxuries weigh
more in the individual tax liability than necessities: hence

i ki(p, θ)
dti
dθ
< 0.
By the same token, if τ (t, y) is concave in y, i.e. if necessities weigh more
than luxuries,

i ki(p, θ)
dti
dθ
> 0.
Clearly, the opposite conclusion would be reached by changing the relevant
signs when a variation of θ signals an increase in equality: if luxury goods
weigh more (less) in the tax liability than necessities, optimality will then
require an average increase (decrease) in commodities taxation for all goods.
These results rest on an aggregate constraint, which dictates the sign
of the adjustment: if ceteris paribus a change in inequality would virtually
increase overall revenue (which occurs when either inequality increases and
luxuries dominate, or inequality decreases and necessities dominate), opti-
mality requires that taxation be decreased on average, in order to keep the
revenue constant. Thus, e.g., if inequality goes up and luxuries are the main
source of revenue for the government, the distributional change will bene-
ﬁt the consumption of some households (presumably the richest ones) and
boost overall revenue, in such a way as to more than compensate for the
loss of revenue due to the reduction of consumption of other (presumably
poorer) households: as a result, it is eﬃcient to reduce taxation on average
to balance the government revenue constraint. The same type of reasoning
obviously applies to the other cases, and all can be naturally connected with
the characterization of the tax system given by Proposition 1: indeed, one
might rephrase Proposition 5 by saying that if the tax system is progressive
(or regressive) in the sense of Proposition 1, then an increase in inequality
should lead to an average decrease (or an increase) of tax rates.
These aggregate implications can be cast in terms of aggregate compen-
sated demand by a direct aggregation of (9). Indeed, if one sums over i both
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sides of (9) after multiplication by pi, one obtains

i
pi
∂Hi
∂θ
= −

Y

i
piqifθ(y, θ)dy
+ 1
λ

Y

i
piqi(p, y)−

i
piki

γ (t, y) fθ(y, θ)dy
= 1
λ

Y
(y − 1) γ (t, y) fθ(y, θ)dy (12)
where

Y

i piqifθ(y, θ)dy =

Y
yfθ(y, θ)dy = 0 since θ does not aﬀect mean
income.18 The following can then be easily shown by assuming the linearity
of the social marginal utility of income:
Proposition 6 Suppose ∂
2γ
∂y2
= 0 and let an increase in θ signal an increase
in inequality for given mean: then if the social marginal utility is increasing
(decreasing) optimality requires an overall decrease (increase) of taxation, i.e
sign

i pi
∂Hi
∂θ

= sign

∂γ
∂y

.
Proof. By the standard properties of stochastic dominance, sign

i pi
∂Hi
∂θ

=
sign

∂2
∂y2
[(y − 1) γ (t, y)]

, while the linearity of γ implies ∂
2
∂y2
[(y − 1) γ (t, y)] =
2
λ
∂γ
∂y
.
The connection between Propositions 5 and 6 lies in the behaviour of the
social marginal utility of income. Say the latter is increasing: by Proposition
6 an increase in inequality makes for a positive marginal value of the overall
compensated demands, which implies an overall decrease in taxation. But
the social marginal utility of income will be increasing when the tax system
is progressive enough to overcome the (decreasing, say) marginal utility of
consumption:19 in such a case, an inequality shock boosts the consumption
of the rich and thus the tax revenue (virtually beyond the government’s
revenue constraint), so that overall taxation should decrease to meet the
18Since

i pi

Y
∂v
∂y
qi(p, y)f(y, θ)dy =

Y
∂v
∂y
yf(y, θ)dy, the individual budget constraint
implies

i piki = 1.
19Notice that ∂2τ/∂y2 > 0 if ℓ > 1. If the marginal utility of income is not decreasing,
γ wil be increasing in income provided τℓ (ℓ+ ε− 1) /y2 > −∂2γ/∂y2, (see note 10).
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required revenue. This is consistent with the intuition underlying Proposition
5, as we know that the tax system will indeed be progressive if luxuries
weigh more than necessities. While both propositions rely on the eﬀects of
the progressivity or regressivity of the tax system on overall tax revenue,
the focus on compensated demands in Proposition 6 means that a milder
condition on progressivity/regressivity is required in this case, viz., that the
system be progressive enough to make the social marginal utility increasing
with income.
4 The equity vs eﬃciency tradeoﬀ
In this section we look at the time honoured issue of the equity-eﬃciency
trade-oﬀ, from the perspective of the interaction between an inequality in-
creasing change in income distribution, and the reaction this implies in the
tax structure if optimal taxation is to be implemented. In principle there is
a well known conﬂict between eﬃciency and equity reasons concerning the
optimal taxation of luxuries or necessities: eﬃciency requires a higher taxa-
tion on necessities, which however represent a great share of expenditure for
low-income individuals; so eﬃcient taxation is likely to be regressive and, in
order to avoid these regressive eﬀects, equity is traded oﬀ against eﬃciency
by levying higher taxation on luxuries. The underlying rationale for this
conclusion is that the price elasticity of necessities is typically low, which
minimises the distortionary eﬀects of taxation.
This intuition can be recovered also in our framework, where however the
price elasticity of demand is itself aﬀected by the income distribution. The
own price elasticity of market demand for good i is:
ηQi (p, θ) =

Y
ηi(p, y)ϕi(p, y, θ)
where
ηi(p, y) =
−(∂qi/∂pi)pi
qi
, ϕi(y; p, θ) =
qi (p, y) f(y, θ)
Qi (p, θ)
the former being the (positive) individual price elasticity of demand, and the
latter the density of the distribution of demand by income classes, such that
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the corresponding distribution is
Φi(y, p, θ) =
 y
ymin
ϕi(x; p, θ)dx
It can be easily shown that:
∂ηQi
∂θ
=
pi
Qi

∂Qi/∂θ
Qi(p, θ)

Y
∂qi
∂pi
f(y, θ)dy −

Y
∂qi
∂pi
fθ(y, θ)dy)

(13)
It is clear from (13) that the income distribution aﬀects market demand
elasticity. More precisely, it is possible to show that:20
Proposition 7 If the individual demand curve is convex (concave) in income
and ∂3qi/∂pi∂y
2 is nonnegative (nonpositive) then a more unequal income
distribution results in a lower (higher) price elasticity of market demand.
Proof. If the Engel curve is convex, ∂Qi/∂θ > 0: hence the ﬁrst term is
negative (since ∂qi/∂pi < 0). By the same token, if the price derivative of
the individual demand curve is convex also the second term is negative. Of
course, the opposite results emerge if we are dealing with concave functions.
This simple result can be linked to the distinction between the direct
and indirect eﬀects of income distribution on aggregate demand and taxation
discussed in Section 3, and shows how this distinction can enrich the analysis
of the tradeoﬀ between equity and eﬃciency. Indeed, it is easily seen that in
the classical case of no cross eﬀect, if the direct eﬀect dominates the indirect
eﬀect, then there may be a reconciliation between equity and eﬃciency issues.
To see this, consider the optimality condition (2) in the absence of cross
eﬀects
ti
∂Qi
∂pi
+Qi =
1
λ

Y
∂v
∂y
qi(p, y)f(y, θ)dy
which can be solved for ti in terms of own market price elasticity to get
ti =
1
ηQi


−pi +
1
λQi

Y
∂v
∂y
piqi(p, y)f(y, θ)dy

20Within a discrete framework, Ibragimov and Ibragimov (2007) reach similar results
using the Schur concavity (or convexity) properties of cross-price elasticities.
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In this formulation, the direct eﬀect boils down to
∂
∂θ
−pi
ηQi
=
pi
ηQi
	2 ∂ηQi∂θ
so that the direct eﬀect has the same pattern as the elasticity of demand,
implying that (in the case considered in Proposition 7) luxuries should be
taxed more since the inequality shock makes their demand more rigid; and
by the same token, taxation on necessities should be reduced since their de-
mand becomes more elastic after the inequality shock. Hence, if the direct
eﬀect dominates the indirect eﬀect, there is in this case a reconciliation be-
tween equity and eﬃciency issues. Clearly, if we have an opposite second
order distributional shock causing an increase in equality and the direct ef-
fect dominates, eﬃciency will call for an increase in taxation for necessities
and a decrease for luxuries — in which case we recover the idea that it is
eﬃcient to tax more necessities, as the traditionally more rigid commodities.
4.1 Equity and eﬃciency: the tradeoﬀ in terms of wel-
fare
Let us deﬁne the social welfare function at the optimum as:
W (R, θ) = V (p + t(R, θ), θ) (14)
which gives overall welfare once the tax burden has been eﬃciently allocated
across commodities (and hence across tax-payers via their budget constraint).
An (exogenous) increase in inequality yields a change in welfare (after the
optimal tax adjustment) given by
dW
dθ
=

i
∂V
∂pi
dti
dθ
+
∂V
∂θ
(15)
Now notice that (a) indirect utility is always non increasing in prices, i.e.
∂v
∂pi
≤ 0, so ∂V
∂pi
< 0; (b) if the marginal utility of income is decreasing, v(p, y)
is concave in income so that ∂V
∂θ
< 0. Substituting in the revenue constraint,
we get:

i
∂T
∂ti
dti
dθ
= −
∂T
∂θ
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From the ﬁrst order conditions of problem (1) we have ∂V
∂pi
= −λ∂T
∂ti
, so that
dW
dθ
=

i
∂V
∂pi
dti
dθ
+
∂V
∂θ
= −λ

i
∂T
∂ti
dti
dθ
+
∂V
∂θ
= λ
∂T
∂θ
+
∂V
∂θ
So an increase in inequality has an indirect eﬀect on welfare, due to the eﬃ-
cient tax adjustments on consumption (λ∂T
∂θ
), and a direct eﬀect due instead
to the consumption changes directly driven by variation in individual income
(∂V
∂θ
). The latter will be always negative if the marginal utility of income
is decreasing in income, since then the social planner is inequality averse.
However, the former will depend on the distribution of necessity vs luxury
goods:
Proposition 8 Suppose an increase in θ signals an increase in inequality
for given mean income. Then (a) if luxuries dominate in the individual tax
liability, there is a welfare gain in the tax adjustments; (b) if necessities
dominate, there is a welfare-eﬃciency tradeoﬀ.
Both results follow trivially from Proposition 2. On the one hand, if luxu-
ries weigh more in the individual tax liability than necessities, an increase in
inequality leads to an average decrease in taxation (∂T
∂θ
> 0), so that if the
tax system is suﬃciently progressive ( λ∂T
∂θ
> ∂V
∂θ
) there will be a net increase
in welfare; on the other hand, if necessities weigh more in the individual
tax liability than luxuries, λ∂T
∂θ
< 0 and the tax adjustment will further de-
crease the welfare beyond the direct eﬀect (∂V
∂θ
) — and a decrease in inequality
will make for a welfare gain in the case of dominating necessities, and for a
welfare-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ to occur in the case of a dominance of luxuries. By
way of conclusion, one can connect this result with the distinction between
the direct and the indirect eﬀect: an increase in inequality can be met by
optimal tax adjustments without trading oﬀ eﬃciency against equity, if luxu-
ries dominate in a way strong enough (i.e., their Engel curves are suﬃciently
convex) to make the direct overcome the indirect eﬀect. Indeed, in such a
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case, necessities should beneﬁt from an eﬃcient relative reduction in taxa-
tion, beyond the aggregate average reduction supported by the dominance of
luxuries in the individual tax liability.
5 Concluding remarks
We provide a general framework to study the relationship between income
distribution and optimal commodity taxation, and show that distributional
shocks have two eﬀects on optimal consumption taxes: a direct eﬀect driven
by changes in aggregate demands, and an indirect eﬀect due to behavioural
adjustments. In our framework, this leads to clear cut policy prescriptions
for the taxation of luxuries and necessities and for aggregate taxation, as
well as conditions under which the conﬂict between equity and eﬃciency
can be overcome. These results are linked to to the overall regressivity or
progressivity properties of the tax system.
We think that this analysis provides an interesting framework which can
be further developed in future research. Under this respect, a ﬁrst natural
extension seems to be towards including individual taste heterogeneity. Sec-
ondly, as our theoretical results provide suﬃcient statistics related to the cur-
vature of the Engel curve of a single commodity and the mean/variance of the
income distribution, this could in principle be tested empirically. Thirdly,
the framework we have developed suggests that the optimal taxation cost
of internalising externalities, or controlling "internalities", can be diﬀerent,
according to the income distribution of a society. Finally, we believe this
framework to be potentially ﬁt for studying the linkages of direct and indirect
taxation with diﬀerent market power scenarios. We leave these suggestions
for future research.
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Appendix
A. The expected value of γ (t, y)
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Given that γ (t, y) = ∂v
∂y
+ λ∂τ
∂y
, and that from (3) and
λ =
1
µ−R′

Y
∂v
∂y
yf(y, θ)dy
R′ =

Y

j
tj
∂qj
∂y
yf(y, θ)dy =

Y
∂τ
∂y
yf(y, θ)dy
we have
Y
∂v
∂y
yf(y, θ)dy = λ


µ−

Y
∂τ
∂y
yf(y, θ)dy

so that
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γ (t, y)
yf(y, θ)
µ
dy =
 

∂v
∂y
+ λ
∂τ
∂y

yf(y, θ)
µ
dy
=

∂v
∂y
yf(y, θ)
µ
dy + λ

Y
∂τ
∂y
yf(y, θ)
µ
dy
= λ
µ−

Y
∂τ
∂y
yf(y, θ)dy
µ
+ λ

Y
∂τ
∂y
yf(y, θ)
µ
dy = λ
B. Derivation of equation (9)
The eﬀect of a change of θ on Hi is given by
∂Hi
∂θ
= −

Y
qi(p, y)fθ(y, θ)dy +
∂
∂θ


1
λ

Y
γ (t, y) qi(p, y)f(y, θ)dy

Letting ∂
∂θ

1
λ

Y
γ (t, y) qi(p, y)f(y, θ)dy

= Λθ to ease notation, we have to
show that
Λθ =
1
λ

Y
[qi(p, y)− ki] γ (t, y) fθ(y, θ)dy (B.1)
By diﬀerentiating 1
λ

Y
γ (t, y) qi(p, y)f(y, θ)dy wrt θ one gets
Λθ = −
λθ
λ2

Y
γ (t, y) qi(p, y)f(y, θ)dy +
1
λ

Y
γθ (t, y) qi(p, y)f(y, θ)dy
+ 1
λ

Y
γ (t, y) qi(p, y)fθ(y, θ)dy.
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where to ease notation we let subscritps denote derivatives. We know that
γ (t, y) = ∂v
∂y
+ λ∂τ
∂y
, so that γθ = λθ
∂τ
∂y
: hence, by substituting in the above
we get
Λθ = −
λθ
λ

Y
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λ
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γ (t, y) qi(p, y)fθ(y, θ)dy (B.2)
From λ =

Y
γ (t, y) yf(y,θ)
µ
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(B.3)
so that
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One can now substituting the former in (B.2), to get:
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where by using (B.3)
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which is independent on y.
C. Proof of Proposition 5
By the standard properties of second order stochastic dominance for given
mean, it is true from (8) that
sign

∂Hi
∂θ

= sign

[γ (t, y)− λ]
∂2qi
∂y2
+ 2
∂qi
∂y
∂γ
∂y

Consider now case (a). Notice that sign

∂γ
∂y

= sign{γ (t, y)− γ (t, ymin)},
and, since λ is the expected value of γ, sign

∂γ
∂y

= sign{λ− γ (t, ymin)}, so
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that
2∂γ
∂y
λ− γ (t, ymin)
> 0
Let now B = [γ (t, y)− λ] ∂
2qi
∂y2
+ 2∂qi
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∂y2
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ensures Bmin < 0 in the former case and Bmin > 0 in the latter, and hence
it provides an upper bound on (relative) convexity such that sign

∂γ
∂y

=
sign

∂Hi
∂θ

. If γ is linear in income, ∂γ
∂y
= β (t) is a constant such that γ can
be written as γ (t, y) = α(t) + β (t) y; hence, using (6)
γ (t, ymin)− λ = β

ymin −
µ2 + σ2
µ

so that
2∂γ
∂y
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=
2µ
µ2 + σ2 − µymin
where we use the fact that

Y
y2f(y, θ)dy = µ2 + σ2. Similarly for case (b),
sign

∂γ
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
= sign{γ (t, ymax)− γ (t, y)}, and, since λ is the expected value of
γ, sign

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
= sign{γ (t, ymax)− λ}, so that
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ensures Bmax < 0 in the former case and Bmax > 0 in the latter, and hence
it provides a lower bound on (relative) concavity such that sign

∂γ
∂y

=
sign

∂Hi
∂θ

. Again, one can write
2∂γ
∂y
λ− γ (t, ymax)
= −
2µ
µymax − (µ2 + σ2)
by using the fact that under linearity γ (t, y) = α(t)+β (t) y, and

Y
y2f(y, θ)dy =
µ2 + σ2.
34
 
